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FROM CAUSE TO RESPONSIBILITY: R2P AS A MODERN 
JUST WAR 
 
ZAMARIS SAXON*  
AND  
LARA PRATT** 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the relationship between just war theory and the modern principle of responsibility 
to protect (R2P).  In the absence of the principle’s clear use as a justification for the use of force, this 
article considers two situations which prompted debate about the applicability of the principle - the UN 
Security Council authorised no-fly-zone in Libya in 2011 and the decision not to use force in Syria in 
2012.  The article’s core message is that the debates about R2P suggest that rather than view R2P as a 
‘new’ principle of international law, it should be viewed as a modern incarnation of the historic principles 
of just war.  The just war criteria of ‘just cause’ and ‘proportionality’ remain the guiding standards by 
which an exercise of R2P will be judged.  R2P remains a developing principle and, the absence of state 
practice in this area means that states wanting to intervene to protect foreign populations from atrocities 
are left without clear legal justification for such action.  In the absence of UN Security Council 
authorisation, use of force under the banner of R2P remains contentious.  In the absence of a clear legal 
status, consideration of R2P’s just war origins in the context of recent discourse is helpful in 
understanding when such force may be legitimate. 
 
I     INTRODUCTION 
 
Acts which are now labelled as ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ by the modern world1 
are not confined to the annals of history.  The general prohibition on the use of force, found in 
the Charter of the United Nations (‘UN Charter’), sought to protect humanity from the ‘scourge 
of war’ and ensure that military force would not be used ‘save in the common interest’.2  The 
UN Charter therefore confined the use of force to a limited number of exceptions.3  Such 
exceptions have proved insufficient in responding to and preventing atrocities.  Responsibility 
to protect (‘R2P’) is the latest international development which attempts to respond to and end 
such occurrences.4  R2P encompasses a wide range of possible actions including aid, early 
warning mechanisms, other non-military measures designed to compel compliance, and at 
times the use of force.5  R2P as a legal justification for military intervention to bring an end to 
such atrocities, particularly in the absence of United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) 
authorisation, however remains controversial.6  This article places R2P within the context of 
                                                 
* BA/LLB, University of Notre Dame Australia 
** PhD (Macquarie University); Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Notre Dame Australia 
1 See Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (Yale 
University Press, 2007). 
2 Charter of the United Nations, preamble. 
3 Charter of the United Nations arts 2(4), 51.  
4 Stevie Martin, ‘Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Mutually Exclusive or Co-Dependent?’ (2011) 
20(1) Griffith Law Review 153, 153-4.  
5 See Report of the Secretary-General - Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect, UN GAOR, 
64th sess, Agenda Items 48 and 114, UN Doc A/63/864 (14 July 2010). 
6 See, eg, John Janzekovic, The Use of Force in Humanitarian Intervention: Morality and Practicalities (Ashgate, 
2008) 103.  See also  Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Battling Terrorism: Legal Perspectives on the Use of Force 
and the War on Terror (Ashgate, 2005) 124 ff,  for a concise discussion of the retaliation/anticipatory self-defence 
arguments put forward by the US in 2002/3. 
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just war theory and suggests that, while the absence of sufficient state practice and clear opinio 
juris leave the legal status of R2P-motivated military action unclear, such action can be located 
in the long history of just war.  Consequently, just war provides a framework for understanding 
where R2P military action may be legitimate. 
 
The primary justification of R2P relies on the acceptance that if modern state-sovereignty is 
limited rather than absolute, then the guiding principle of non-intervention may be overcome 
upon a state abusing its citizens.  Whilst individual states can intervene without the imprimatur 
of the UNSC, such as when it is deadlocked or hampered by political machinations, such 
intervention must still comply with the original just war framework.  This is one of the offered 
interpretations of the R2P principle. 
 
The alternative justification, unrelated to sovereignty, suggests that a state’s use of force 
without UNSC approval fulfils a secondary responsibility to international peace and security 
under the UN Charter.  The state practice for this possibility becoming customary law through 
R2P is an evolution of humanitarian intervention, such as occurred in Kosovo.  Force in this 
manner must still be conducted as a last resort, with just cause, be proportionate to the harm 
being done and have a reasonable chance of success.  It must not be undertaken lightly and the 
responsibility is still limited to what is required to bring an end to the wrongful act; this is 
traceable to the past theory of just war. 
 
In Part II the existing framework for the use of force is briefly discussed; in particular, the UN 
Charter system which limits the circumstances in which states may lawfully resort to force, 
and prima facie makes unlawful the use of force in the absence of either self-defence or an 
UNSC resolution.  Part III offers a brief explanation of just war theory and ties the traditional 
rationales legitimising use of force to the modern framework, including both R2P and its pre-
cursor, humanitarian intervention.  Part IV considers the role R2P played in two contemporary 
uprisings: in Libya, 2011; and in Syria, 2012/2013.  Finally Part V concludes that the current 
use of force under the banner of R2P, is the best option to allow the prevention of future 
atrocities, even if the principle is still evolving. 
 
II     EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF FORCE   
 
In one sense, the law regarding use of force is relatively straight forward.  The UN Charter 
ensures all states are equally sovereign,7 with art 2(4) specifying a general prohibition against 
using force to interfere in the territorial integrity and political independence of a state.8  This 
basic rule precludes both the United Nations (‘UN’) and member states ‘interven[ing] in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’ of the state in question.9  The 
prohibition on the use of force is also a part of customary international law.10  This prohibition 
is subject to two clear exceptions: firstly, the enforcement of international peace and security 
as authorised by the UNSC; and secondly, the right of self-defence.  The parameters and extent 
of the exceptions remain less certain. 
 
                                                 
7 Charter of the United Nations art 2(1). 
8 Ibid art 2(4). 
9 Ibid art 2(7). 
10  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Judgement) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 100. 
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The UN mandate includes maintenance of international peace and security, and human rights 
promotion. 11   The UN Charter gives the UNSC primary responsibility for maintaining 
international peace and security.12  A range of methods short of force can be used to achieve 
this,13 but ultimately, the UNSC can authorise the use of force where appropriate.14  Given that 
all states upon becoming party to the UN Charter agree to settle their disputes peacefully,15 
UNSC guided action should only come into effect where states are unable to resolve disputes 
themselves.  
 
The UNSC’s responsibility is to ‘maint[ain] … international peace and security’16 and it has 
given ‘threats to international peace’ an ever-broadening definition.17  Gross violations of 
human rights, including genocide and crimes against humanity have been recognised as threats 
to international peace and security, and as a consequence fall within the UNSC’s mandate.18  
In determining whether to use force in response to these threats, the UNSC has no explicit 
Charter limitations on when it may do so, aside from a general requirement to act in accordance 
with the ‘Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’.19  Since the UNSC lacks its own 
forces, it falls to member states to facilitate and implement UNSC action to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.20  It is important to note that the UN Charter lacks set legal 
obligations to protect and enforce human rights.  
 
In addition to use of force authorised by the UNSC there is a second widely accepted exception 
to the use of force prohibition.  This is self-defence as authorised under art 51 of the UN 
Charter.  Derived from a pre-UN customary law right,21 self-defence in international law is 
limited by the Caroline criteria of proportionality, necessity and immediacy;22 meaning, action 
taken is confined to defence and not retribution.  The question as to whether the UN Charter’s 
right of self-defence replaces the customary right, or runs concurrently, is outside the ambit of 
this article.23 
 
Running parallel to the UN Charter restrictions are the rules of international humanitarian law 
(‘IHL’).  IHL requires that upon use of force being undertaken, states must abide by four core 
                                                 
11 Charter of the United Nations art 1. 
12 Ibid art 24. 
13 Ibid art 33, 39. These include facilitating peaceful dispute settlement between states and taking preventative or 
enforcement action before use of force. 
14 Ibid art 42. 
15 Ibid art 2(3). 
16 Ibid art 24(1). 
17 Klinton Alexander, ‘NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating Yugoslavia’s National 
Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval’ (2000) 22 Houston Journal of International Law 403, 
412.  
18 See, eg, SC Res 1675, UN SCOR, 5430th mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1675 (28 April 2006). 
19 Charter of the United Nations art 24(2). 
20 Ibid art 2(5). 
21  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Judgement) [1986] ICJ Rep 14. 
22 See Letter from Mr Webster, US Secretary of State to Lord Ashburton, 6 August 1842 <http://avalon.law 
.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp>. 
23 Much of the debate has arisen in the context of discussing the lawfulness of anticipatory self-defence (ie, prior 
to the existence of an armed attack, but with a view to preventing an imminent one).  See, eg, Michael J Glennon, 
‘Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’ (2001) 25(2) 
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 539, 553-56. 
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principles which will limit their available military action.24  This is applicable whether or not 
use of force occurs via self-defence or on another basis.  The four IHL principles limit the 
action taken to only that which is necessary to achieve the specific objective,25 designed only 
to cause harm which is proportionate to the military objective,26 is not unnecessarily cruel or 
inhumane27 and which at all times distinguishes between civilians and combatants.28  Like the 
Caroline criteria, these guiding principles, particularly the first two, suggest war’s legality 
cannot be determined by only looking at whether the initial reason is ‘valid’.  For example, the 
lawfulness of UNSC authorised military action could be undermined if the military objectives 
were not of sufficient gravity to justify the injuries that a particular form of use of force would 
inevitably produce. 
 
Although it would be naïve to suggest regard for the UN system’s rules was solely responsible 
for the lack of a ‘World War’ post-1945,29 it is clear that respect for the UNSC action and self-
defence as exceptions to use of force have been integral.  If it is argued however, that the UN 
Charter offers comprehensive coverage of the law regarding use of force, it raises the important 
question of what recourse exists as an alternative where the UNSC fails to act in defence of 
human rights abuses occurring within a state’s sovereign borders.  Since the UNSC’s creation 
it has never directly authorised use of force in order to prevent or stop genocide or crimes 
against humanity.  The atrocities which were allowed to occur in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslav Republics, resulted from the failure of non-forceful methods, combined with political 
deadlocks and preference for state sovereignty, constraining the UNSC from adequately 
fulfilling its mandate to protect international peace and security.30 
 
A consequence of the UNSC failures in the 1990s was the renewed debate over the scope of 
exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force when the UNSC fails to act.  First, 
humanitarian intervention, and then R2P, arose as explanations for how states may legitimise 
                                                 
24 It is not the purpose of this article to provide an extensive review of IHL principles, nor to argue their customary 
international law status. Extensive discussion and evidence of the customary status of the IHL rules can be found 
in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 2005). The sources in the following footnotes are indicative only. 
25 See, eg, Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg art 6; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered 
into force 21 October 1950) arts 27, 54. 
26 See, eg, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 7 December 1979), art 51(5)(b). 
27 See, eg, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols) (As Amended on 21 
December 2001), opened for signature 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 1983), 
preamble. 
28 See, eg, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 7 December 1979), art 48. 
29 The politics of ‘mutually assured destruction’ and non-legal considerations influencing the decisions of the 
major powers, must be acknowledged as having a significant role in keeping the majority of conflicts as de facto 
engagements between the major powers; rather than a direct US/USSR war. A concise discussion of many of 
these factors can be found in David S Painter, Cold War: An Interdisciplinary History (Routledge, 1999).  
30 For discussions of the various measures and developments which ultimately led to the failure of the UN to 
prevent atrocities, see, eg, Alan J Kuperman, Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda 
(Brookings, 2001), especially Chs 4, 7; Adam Roberts, ‘NATO's “Humanitarian War” over Kosovo’ (1999) 41(3) 
Survival 102, 103-4; C Guicherd, ‘International Law and the War in Kosovo’ (1999) 41(2) Survival 19, 27.  
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using force in defence of the world’s most helpless and victimised.  The two approaches to use 
of force outside of UNSC authorisation are inherently linked, but offer slightly different 
rationales.  Humanitarian intervention, as understood in the 1990s, has largely been replaced 
by R2P when states seek to justify their use of force against those who commit atrocities.31  
The remainder of this article examines how humanitarian intervention and R2P fit within the 
tradition of just war, and how through this, R2P can be seen as having a legal basis in the 
modern international system.  The article also discusses the effect of a changed definition of 
sovereignty, including its effect on statehood. 
  
III    THEORETICAL AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
A     Just War Theory 
 
Just war theory predates the modern UN system, and also predates the Westphalian system of 
states.32  Just wars’ influence continues to be seen within the modern international legal rules 
governing the use of force.  It is acknowledged that just war is not a monolithic tradition, as it 
has appeared in various forms throughout history.33  This article does not purport to be a 
comprehensive study of just war, with this brief historical context seeking only to point to the 
coherent core of just war theory, suggesting there are circumstances where it is legitimate for 
states to use force, notwithstanding the plethora of other obligations states have acquired.  The 
question in modern times has shifted from legitimate to legal.34  Despite this shift, modern 
international law’s prohibition on the use of force (and the limited exceptions) clearly find their 
roots in just war theory. 
 
Just war theory is based on the premise that there is no absolute right to wage war. Just war 
requires that states resorting to use of force must only do so within certain constraints; both 
with regard to the reasons for going to war and the manner in which that war is conducted.   
 
Just war requires use of force by states to be justified against certain criteria.  The authority 
making the decision to use force35 needs to base it on just cause undertaken to advance a good 
                                                 
31  See, eg, Janzekovic, above n 6.  See also Maogoto, above n 6, for a concise discussion of the 
retaliation/anticipatory self-defence arguments put forward by the US in 2002/3. 
32 For a concise explanation of the development of the principle of just war from antiquity to modern times, see, 
eg, Joachim von Elbe, ‘The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law’ (1939) 33(4) American 
Journal of International Law 665. 
33 Ibid. 
34 The concepts of legitimate and legal are not always clearly distinguishable. In this article, legal is used to refer 
to those actions which comply with the formal legal rules of the international system. An action which is legitimate 
is one which is morally and ethically defensible. In international law, actions viewed as ‘illegal but legitimate’ 
may result in widespread acceptance of the action and lack of enthusiasm for legal sanction for the technically 
illegal act. For a good discussion of this admittedly controversial division, see Thomas M Franck, Recourse to 
Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 174-91. 
35 This will become significant when considering the lawfulness of R2P when it is not exercised by the United 
Nations. For Augustine and succeeding theorists, authority was generally tied to the sovereign or government. 
See, eg, John J Davenport, ‘Just War Theory, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Need for a Democratic 
Federation’ (2011) 39(3) Journal of Religious Ethics 493, 512. 
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intention.36  Further, the ‘just cause’ had to be one of ‘substantial importance’,37 suggesting the 
choice to use military action in order to advance this good intention, must be of sufficient 
weight that such an extreme response was necessary and proportionate to the cause.38  Brown 
has suggested this proportionality criteria is paramount in understanding and maintaining, the 
legitimacy of any use of force.39  In applying this principle to World War I, Biggar explains 
the rationale for needing proportionality in a more pragmatic manner; ‘if the violence used is 
not proportionate to one's purported end, then there is prima facie reason to doubt what is 
purported.’40 
 
A good cause alone is therefore insufficient, if one is to accept Augustine’s starting point of 
pacifist inclination.41  War, Augustine suggested, is only legitimate when a wrong has been 
perpetrated by the opposing side, ‘a wrong so grievous that neither the wrongdoer nor their 
victims would be well served by leniency.’42  Augustine also pointed to additional criteria to 
be assessed in determining whether a war is just.  Most notably the criteria includes the need 
for war to be a ‘last resort’ and that there be a good ‘prospect of success’; ie, a fight which 
cannot be won, cannot achieve the underlying good cause.43  According to Steinhoff these 
additional criteria are most helpfully considered as sub-conditions of the ‘just cause’ and 
‘proportionate response’ criteria: 
 
Whether a war is proportionate also depends on what other means are available and how likely they are 
to achieve the positive results that the war is supposed to bring about.  Thus, one can only determine 
whether there is a just cause by considering these other criteria.44 
 
Whether one views these additional criteria as distinct or subsidiary, it is clear the core 
characteristics of Augustine’s just war theory are found as common threads through later 
theorists, who sought to reconcile the prima facie wrongfulness of war, with the apparent 
continued recourse to war in the face of real or perceived injustice.  Francisco Suarez, for 
example, writing a millennium after Augustine, explained: 
[N]ot every cause [is] sufficient to justify war, but only those causes which are serious and commensurate 
with the losses that the war would occasion. For it would be contrary to reason to inflict very grave harm 
because of a slight injustice.45 
The proportionality of the ‘war’ response will always be situation specific; dependent on the 
seriousness of the offence, the availability of alternative mechanisms and the likelihood of a 
swift and satisfactory conclusion to the conflict.  Even the most serious of causes must only 
                                                 
36 For a discussion on the development of the concept of just cause and right intention see David D Corey and 
Daryl J Charles, Just War Tradition: An Introduction (ISI Books, 2012) 1-22.  
37 Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Just War and Humanitarian Intervention’ (2001) 17 American University International 
Law Review 1, 7. 
38 Uwe Steinhoff, ‘Just Cause and Right Intention’ (2014) 13(1) Journal of Military Ethics 32, 34-35. 
39 Gary D Brown, ‘Proportionality and Just War’ (2003) 2(3) Journal of Military Ethics 171, 174. 
40 Nigel Biggar, In Defence of War (Oxford University Press, 2013) Chs 2, 4. 
41 Steinhoff, above n 38, 34-35; John Mark Mattox, St Augustine and the Theory of Just War (Continuum 
International Publishing, 2006) 60-61. 
42 Corey and Charles, above n 36, 58. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Steinhoff, above n 38, 33-6. 
45 Francisco Suárez, Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez, vol 2 (Clarendon Press, 1944) 816. 
FROM CAUSE TO RESPONSIBILITY 
141 
 
warrant resorting to war with due consideration to the impact and consequences of that action. 
In modern parlance: ‘Don’t barge in and make a bad situation worse’.46 
 
As international law and theory shifted towards what is now recognised as ‘modern’ 
international law, Hugo Grotius offered the most comprehensive analysis of how just war 
remains relevant to the sovereign state system.  This resulted from the basic principle of non-
intervention being the basis of the Westphalian peace, as opposed to merely being a reflection 
of it.  While Grotius owes much to his predecessors,47 his De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of 
War and Peace) remains influential in understanding the appropriate scope of war.  This can 
be largely attributed to Grotius’ attempt to shift the discussion from a theological to a secular 
basis, and from a moral to a legal framework.48 
 
It should be noted that Grotius also emphasised the formalities of war, which was later linked 
to the post-Westphalian European positivist’s focus on form over substance.49  Certainly the 
trend in the years, even centuries, following from Grotius’ writings was dominated by an 
emphasis on positivism. States were led by ‘Machiavellian princes…driven by “reason of 
State”’, 50  and within this framework, sovereigns gave little or no consideration to wars’ 
‘justice’ or ‘morality’. 51   Grotius, however, did devote attention to causes which could 
legitimately justify a formal warfare declaration, whilst warning that in the absence of 
authoritative bodies to judge the legitimacy of the claim to justice, law could do little to in fact 
stop illegitimate wars from being waged.52  
 
Grotius identified exemplar circumstances of ‘just causes’ for armed conflict, with the first two 
being self-defence and recovery of land.  More interestingly for this article, however, are the 
other ‘just causes’ which legitimise the use of force, including where a State has failed to meet 
its international legal obligations, and punishment of wrongdoing within the law of nature;53 
provided that the crimes in question were ‘heinous and manifest’.54  Grotius did not expressly 
include wars of liberation, as subjected populations were not his concern. 55   Although, 
                                                 
46 Elshtain, above n 37, 8. 
47 The extent of Grotius’ reliance (direct or indirect) on theorists such as Francisco Suarez, Franciscus de Vitoria 
and Alberico Gentili (among others) is unclear – but has been addressed in later commentaries on his work. See, 
eg, Renee Jeffery, Hugo Grotius in International Thought (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 27-8. (Jeffrey provides a 
literature review of other scholars on this point). 
48 Ibid 28; Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (Yale, 2004) 5; James Turner Johnson, Ethics and the Use of 
Force: Just War in a Historical Perspective (Ashgate, 2011) 83-4. 
49  Robert J Delahunty and John Yoo, ‘From Just War to False Peace’ (2012) 13(1) Chicago Journal of 
International Law 1, 19; Robert J Delahunty and John Yoo, ‘Making War’ (2007) 93 Cornell Law Review 123, 
142-43; Steven Forde, ‘Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War’ (1998) 92(3) The American Political Science Review 
639, 645. 
50 Walzer, above n 48, 5. 
51 Delahunty and Yoo, ‘From Just War to False Peace’, above n 49, 25. 
52 Ibid 18-19; G I A D Draper, ‘Grotius' Place in the Development of Legal Ideas about War’ in Hedley Bull, 
Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford University Press, 
1992) 177, 201. 
53 For a concise overview of Grotius’ causes see Jeffery, above n 47, 40; Christoph Stumph, ‘Hugo Grotius: Just 
War Thinking Between Theology and International Law’ in Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven and William A Barbieri 
(eds), Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, Volume 120: From Just War to Modern Peace Ethics (Walter de Gruyter, 
2012) 197, 407-410; Draper, above n 52, 194-96. 
54 Grotius, cited in Jeffery, above n 47, 48. 
55 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International War (Oxford, 2002) 
15. 
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interestingly, Grotius did allow for ‘private’ war to be conducted, for example by the Dutch 
East India Company against those who would wrongfully deprive them of property.56  Even 
though Grotius was wary of extending international law’s applicability to those fighting against 
an unjust sovereign, he did concede international law would legitimise humanitarian wars.57  
Such wars would be limited to the most extreme cases.  Where one sovereign had violated the 
rights of his subjects it was ‘open to another sovereign to assert the rights of the oppressed 
subjects and intervene on their behalf.’58  
 
Theorists both prior to and post Grotius have emphasised the universal character of natural law, 
and the fundamental rights of humankind which it protects.59  It then follows, if one recognises 
the common humanity which forms the basis of the law of nature as the basis of the 
international legal regime, a war which is conducted in defence of those subject to the most 
heinous of atrocities, would be not only just in a moral sense,60 but legal justice would permit, 
and perhaps demand it.61  Of course all are wary to emphasise that the offence must be one of 
the most extreme sort to justify intervening in the affairs of a sovereign state.62  Even prior to 
formalising the rules on use of force post-1945, reliance on ‘humanitarian intervention’ to 
legitimise military action was rare, and reserved to the most shocking of atrocities.63 
 
B     Just War Theory and the Modern Rules 
 
If one accepts that the two core elements of just war theory are just cause, including but not 
limited to the rescue of people abused by their sovereign, and proportionality, including 
likelihood of success, then the modern rules governing use of force can be explained as a 
modernisation of the just war theory.  The theorists discussed in the previous section were, as 
Grotius acknowledged, operating within an international order where ‘informal’ mechanisms 
were no more than political negotiations lacking formal mechanisms for dispute settlement.64  
Consequently, the justifications for entry into war, can be seen as taking into account the 
absence of viable alternatives for resolving conflicts and disputes.  At the same time, the act of 
warfare still imposes the proportionality requirement, suggesting that law would not legitimise 
the use of force for any and all insults to the rights of a sovereign.65 
 
                                                 
56 Jeffery, above n 47, 37; Patrick A Messina and Craig J N de Paulo, ‘The Influence of Augustine on the 
Development of Just War Theory’ in Craig J N de Paulo (ed), Augustinian Just War Theory and the Wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq: Confessions, Contentions, and the Lust for Power (Peter Lang Publishing, 2011) 23, 46-
48; Draper, above n 52, 204. 
57 Chesterman, above n 55, 15. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Stumph, above n 53, 202-6. 
60 Jeffery, above n 47, 42; Draper, above n 52, 204. 
61 Jeffery, above n 47, 42; Draper, above n 52, 204. 
62 Chesterman, above n 55, 15-16; Stumph, above n 53, 197, 211. 
63 Garret provides an excellent overview of pre-20th century intervention highlighting how just war theory did 
extend past ‘mere’ theory, albeit its application was tempered by the geo-political interests of the applicable state 
powers. Recognised examples of action based largely on humanitarian concerns include: European powers’ 
intervention in Greece after the violent suppression of independence movements (1827); French led action 
following the massacre of Maronite Christians in Ottoman Lebanon/Syria (1860); Russian intervention in the 
Balkans following particularly violent atrocities by Turkish troops in Bulgaria (1870s); the US in response to 
Spanish Concentration Camps in Cuba (1889). See Stephen A Garrett, Doing Good and Doing Well: An 
Examination of Humanitarian Intervention (Greenwood Publishing, 1999) 10-14. 
64 Delahunty and Yoo, ‘From Just War to False Peace’, above n 49, 18-19. 
65 Jeffery, above n 47, 48. 
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Modern international law provides alternatives not previously available to sovereign states 
existing before the 20th century.  There is also the requirement introduced from art 2(3) of the 
UN Charter of a formal obligation to make use of the non-forceful dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  Further, while ‘right authority’ was only briefly acknowledged as part of just war 
theory in the preceding section, this is because there was previously little or no debate about 
where such authority lay.  At most, there is some debate over whether ‘just war’ would entitle 
a population to rise up against the oppressive sovereign, as opposed to the right of another 
sovereign to intervene to protect the other sovereign’s population.66  Notwithstanding this 
debate, it is clear that, by and large, historic authority lay with the sovereign, and in the post-
Westphalian era this was more specifically the sovereign state. 
 
The modern rules governing use of force add an interesting dimension to the application of just 
war theory.  This will be specifically discussed with regard to humanitarian intervention, but 
in short the UNSC has been introduced as a clear authority beyond that of the sovereign state.  
This is due to the wide acceptance of states to UN Charter terms granting power to the UNSC.  
The more controversial question, is the extent that the UN Charter has led to the UNSC 
effectively replacing the sovereign state as the ‘right authority’ for use of force within the 
international system. 
 
The UNSC clearly has significant power to authorise use of force within the scope of its 
Chapter VII powers.  It is equally clear that force has been exercised without UNSC 
authorisation, and prior to the example of Kosovo, such action faced relatively little sanction.67  
Krisch suggests that while the legal rules within the UN Charter have not changed since 1945, 
‘[t]he relatively strong defence of the norm prohibiting intervention without [UNSC] 
authorisation represents a significant shift in the parameters of the use of force since the Cold 
War.’68  This is in part attributable to the political ideology stalemate that occurred during the 
Cold War.  
 
C     ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ 
 
In one sense, the post-1945 approach to the use of armed force can be seen as a modern 
adaptation of the ‘just war’ theory into a legal framework.  By narrowing ‘just causes’ to self-
defence and the maintenance of international peace and security, whilst maintaining the 
requirements of proportionality and necessity, just war could be said to be synonymous with 
legal war.  The pre-UN theorists however, were working in a situation in which the sovereign, 
and later the sovereign state, was the only actor of any importance.  Thus, while ‘right 
authority’ warranted mere mention in the above section, it becomes a matter of importance 
when considering whether force can be used for humanitarian purposes without UNSC 
authority.  
 
                                                 
66 See, eg, R J Vincent, ‘Grotius, Human Rights, and Intervention’ in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam 
Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford University Press, 1992) 241, 248. 
67 See for example the list provided by Holzgreffe which includes ‘the United States in the Dominican Republic 
(1965); India in East Pakistan (1971); Vietnam in Kampuchea (1978 – 93); Tanzania in Uganda (1979); ECOWAS 
in Liberia (1990 – 95’: JL Holzgrefe, ‘The Humanitarian Intervention Debate’ in J L Holzgreffe and Robert O 
Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, 
2003) 15, 46. 
68 Nico Krisch, ‘The Security Council and the Great Powers’ in Vaughan Lowe et al (eds), United Nations Security 
Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945 (Oxford University Press, 2008) 133, 149.  
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Although there is no formal legal definition of humanitarian intervention69  Murphy has put 
forward a helpful working definition.  Humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force 
by a state, collective of states, or an international organization for the primary purpose of 
protecting the target state’s nationals from widespread deprivations of internationally 
recognised human rights.70  The contentious element of course is intervention outside of UN 
authority.  The doctrine of humanitarian intervention emerged from the impracticalities of 
UNSC mandated action where decisions to take action ‘lack[ed] principled coherence’71 and 
failed to prevent atrocities in places such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.  The UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1992 set out the criteria for circumstances where 
humanitarian intervention could be legitimate. 72   The criteria includes: the situation is 
compelling and urgent; the state in which the atrocities have occurred is unwilling or unable to 
act; there is no alternative to external intervention; and intervention is proportional and 
necessary.73  These criteria – presented as representing an exceptional but legal standard74 - 
bear stark similarity to the elements of just war.  In the absence of clear state practice in this 
area, the arguments supporting humanitarian-based action appear to derive from the historic 
just war obligation to protect populations from catastrophes.75  The question remains whether 
the modern development of the UNSC has provided a finite answer with regard to ‘authority’.  
The humanitarian intervention criteria are similar to the common understanding of R2P’s third 
‘pillar’ discussed below.  
 
Much of the debate about humanitarian intervention arose after its use in response to the 
Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s.  Following the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (‘SFRY’) Kosovo was retained as an autonomous province of Serbia (at the time 
part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the successor to the SFRY).76  Conflict arose 
between the local, ethnically Albanian population and the Serbian regime which, by 1997 had 
implemented a policy of repression and utilised force against both the Kosovar ‘freedom 
fighter/terrorist’77 movement seeking autonomy, and the local civilian population.78   
 
In 1998 there was a UNSC resolution, labelling what was occurring in Kosovo a humanitarian 
catastrophe, and an ongoing threat to international peace and security, but without authorising 
                                                 
69  Dorota Gierycz, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ (2010) 29(2) 
Criminal Justice Ethics 110, 111.  
70 Sean D Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 11-12. 
71 Erik A Heinz, Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (State 
University of New York Press, 2009) 64. 
72  (1992) 63 British Yearbook of International Law (Oxford University Press) 824-825; Foreign Affairs 
Committee, House of Commons Paper 235-iii, Session 1992-1993 (1992) 85, 92 both discussed in Evidence to 
Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Commons, Parliament of the United Kingdom, published by order 
of 23 May 2000 [29]-[30] (Professor Ian Brownlie). 
73 Ibid; see also Susan J Atwood, ‘From Just War to Just Intervention’ (2003) 19(1) New England Journal of 
Public Policy 55, 58-9. 
74 UN SCOR, 54th sess, 3988th mtg, UN Doc S/PV.3988 (24 March 1999), 12 (UK). 
75 Atwood, above n 73, 57-8. 
76 See for discussion, Mohammed Taghi Karoubi, Just or Unjust War? (Ashgate, 2004) 176-81. 
77 The debate over terminology can be left to other authors. Contemporaneous reports tended to prefer the 
terminology of ‘terrorist’ but ‘freedom fighter’ became the norm as the extent of the Serbian oppression and 
atrocities became known. A brief 1998 comment on the BBC news website points to the problematic and changing 
‘classification’ of the KLA.  Nened Sebac, ‘The KLA – Terrorists or Freedom Fighters’, BBC World News 
(online), 28 June 1999 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/121818.stm>.  
78 For discussion, see also Karoubi, above n 76, 182-4. 
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express actions to control the situation. 79   The resolution led to certain NATO members 
intervening on humanitarian grounds,80 bombing areas of Kosovo in an effort to prevent any 
further influx of soldiers harming ethnic Albanians in the area.81  The UNSC was unsuccessful 
in passing a resolution declaring NATO’s action, which constituted use of force, as illegal,82 
but did further authorise states to intervene to try and create peace.83  
 
Particular concern was expressed regarding the Kosovo intervention and several states warned 
that the humanitarian necessity of the Kosovo intervention ought not to imply the establishment 
of a legal precedent – placing the action as a necessary but exceptional circumstance.84  Other 
states however, justified the humanitarian intervention as compatible with the principles and 
purposes of the UN when exercised solely for the prevention of human rights abuses.85  Adding 
to this, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht had previously postulated a right of armed humanitarian 
intervention, where ‘a State renders itself guilty of cruelties … in such a way as to deny [its 
nationals] their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind’.86  In 
accordance with the ICJ Statute for determining sources of international law, teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists are relevant in identifying and understanding international 
law,87 and in regards to this article, key to establishing how R2P use of force may be legitimate.  
 
The UN Charter describes the UNSC as having the ‘primary’ responsibility to act in the 
interests of international peace and security.88  As mentioned previously, art 39 of the UN 
Charter, gives the UNSC the power to determine what international threats are.  The 
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has also found that art 24 which confers primary 
responsibility on the UNSC, does not confine all actions for maintaining international peace 
and security to the UNSC’s ‘primary’ responsibility.89  The article’s power is primary as 
opposed to exclusive; however, only the UNSC can legally require states to use force against 
another state.90 
 
                                                 
79 SC Res 1203, UN SCOR, 3937th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998). 
80 See, eg, Stephen Hall, Principles of International Law (LexisNexis, 4th ed, 2014) 457; Ben Kioko, ‘The Right 
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85 (852) International Review of the Red Cross 807, 821. 
81 Paul Williams, J Ulbrick and Jonathan Worboys, ‘Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to 
Protect and the Syria Crisis’ (2012) 45 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 473, 478. 
82 Hall, above n 80, 457.  
83 See Jonathan Charney, ‘Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’ (1999) 93(4) The American Journal 
of International Law 834, 835.  
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Necessitatis’ (1999) 10(4) European Journal of International Law 791, 793-94, 797-99. 
86 Hersch Lauterpacht (ed), L Oppenheim, International Law, A Treatise (Longmans, 8th ed, 1955) 312. 
87 Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38(1)(d). 
88 Charter of the United Nations art 24.  
89 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 163. 
90 Ibid. UNSC ordered force can occur via art 42 of the UN Charter, which gives the UNSC authority to require 
member states to take action, including use of force, to maintain international peace and security upon peaceful 
methods having failed. There are, admittedly, practical and logistical difficulties with requiring states to provide 
tangible military support and the UNSC has tended towards ‘authorising’ rather than ‘requiring’ in its various 
resolutions. See, eg, SC Res 794, UN SCOR, 47th Sess, 3145th Mtg, UN Doc SC/RES/794 (3 Dec 1992). 
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It has been acknowledged by the ICJ that the UN Charter never intended to embody every 
essential principle of international law 91  and the discussion above suggests there is the 
argument (albeit contested) that armed intervention was permissible in circumstances of UNSC 
identified atrocities; due to the UNSC only having a ‘primary’, not ‘sole’ role.  In this context, 
humanitarian use of force becomes more grounded through being based on sovereign 
responsibility, or more particularly, on the failure of the sovereign to meet its responsibilities 
both to the population in preventing atrocities, and the international community, upon threats 
to international peace and security.  
 
In 1999, commenting on the legality of the Kosovo intervention, Cassese suggested that it 
would be ‘judicious to await any repetition of such actions under the same conditions and 
exigencies’ before concluding whether humanitarian intervention had developed into a new 
exception to the general prohibition on the (non-UNSC authorised) use of force.92  The state 
practice necessary for identifying a customary rule in this area remains unclear and 15 years 
after Kosovo the situation remains much discussed, but has not yet been ‘settled’.  While the 
opinio juris clearly points to a limited allowance for use of force when a state has exceeded its 
scope of ‘sovereignty’ by abusing its population, the matter of ‘without UNSC authorisation’ 
is largely untested.  
 
Notwithstanding the argument that gross violations of fundamental rights will undermine a 
state’s claim to sovereignty, interpretation of art 2(4) can change over time as the world 
develops, and if only UNSC identified threats, combined with a deadlocked Council, were 
acted on, then the UN Charter would not be undermined via R2P use of force extended from 
humanitarian intervention.  Legitimate action would still be constrained by the just war 
principles of necessity and proportionality (as the exercise of self-defence is similarly 
constrained, despite the lack of express criteria within the UN Charter itself, as discussed 
above).  This utilises a permissive interpretation of the UN Charter and is consistent with the 
language used in art 2(4), as no direct threat is made to a state’s sustained territory or political 
independence.93  For those who insist on a restrictive interpretation in line with the travaux 
préparatoires, which sought to completely constrain force except where clearly allowed by the 
UN Charter, then the argument below of evolved sovereignty still ensures R2P has a future.94  
Additionally, departure from a restrictive interpretation of the UN Charter is further supported 
if the ‘secondary’ responsibility is acted upon only in the case of a UNSC deadlock.95  Such 
action is arguably still consistent with the purposes of the UN Charter, in particular when 
giving consideration to the preamble which affirms human rights and preventing war for future 
generations.96  In addition to the UNSC only being given ‘primary’ responsibility, this adds 
further to the interpretative basis for justifying a departure from restrictive interpretation, 
coupled with global developments. 
 
D     Responsibility to Protect 
                                                 
91  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Judgement) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 96.  
92 Cassese, above n 85, 797. 
93 Hall, above n 80, 429.  
94 Ibid.  
95 That is, it would be precluded where the UNSC has taken definitive, albeit non-forceful action. 
96 See Charter of the United Nations preamble; Jasmeet Gulati and Ivan Khosa, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: To 
Protect State Sovereignty’ (2013) 41(3) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 397, 400. 
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The mass killings in Srebrenica and Rwanda occurred under the watch of the UN, highlighting 
the collective inadequacies in international institutions.97  This criticism also came from within 
the UN itself, particularly by the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan.98  Consequently, a 2001 
Commission, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (‘ICISS’) 
set up by Canada, developed R2P 99 to improve the flaws in traditional UNSC action and 
Humanitarian Intervention. 100  In querying how intervention can occur without violating State 
sovereignty, the ICISS concluded that sovereignty included a responsibility to protect.101  The 
ICISS alluded to just war’s ‘just cause’ threshold when it identified a test of serious and 
irreparable harm being imminent or occurring, and that the force must be the last course of 
action.102  A UN special report adopted this idea of R2P, reinforcing that modern sovereignty 
now includes obligations to protect the people’s welfare, and that UN collective security means 
the international community shares responsibility in ensuring this; as opposed to a 
humanitarian intervention ‘right’ to intervene.103  
 
A 2005 World Summit outcome, was R2P’s clear and unanimous acceptance by UN members 
through a General Assembly resolution.104  Drawing on the ICISS report, the UN further 
clarified the ‘just cause’ test by limiting R2P to four crimes – genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity,105 as opposed to the ICISS’ more general threshold 
test.106  The United Nations General Assembly (‘UNGA’) accepted responsibility to assist in 
accordance with UN Charter provisions, such as through the UNSC.107  The challenge of 
understanding R2P in the contemporary context is that, despite the unanimous acceptance that 
all states via the UNSC and UNGA have a responsibility to act,108 the resolution was silent on 
what to do should the UNSC fail to meet that responsibility.109 
 
In early 2009, a UN Secretary-General report transformed R2P’s discourse into the 
aforementioned three ‘pillars’ of R2P.  For the first pillar, protection, the responsibility falls 
primarily upon the state.  The second, international assistance, should occur upon state failure.  
The third, international intervention, must be timely and decisive, with peaceful means utilised 
initially.110  In late 2009 an UNGA resolution acknowledged the importance of this report in 
                                                 
97 Report of the Secretary-General - Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, UN GAOR, 63rd sess, Agenda 
Items 44 and 107, UN Doc A/63/677 (12 January 2009) 5 [5]. 
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developing R2P, even though it did not expressly accept the finer details in the report.111  The 
UNGA did however state their continued consideration for R2P, recalling the 2005 resolution.  
The 2009 report emphasised that the UN R2P use of force, pursuant to the 2005 Summit 
outcome, should be channelled through the UNSC.112  
 
Essentially, R2P is the term given to viewing sovereignty as including the responsibility each 
state has to protect its population from mass atrocities.  Deng suggested that failure to realise 
this responsibility, including a failure to seek and accept assistance, places on the international 
community an obligation to ‘find a way of intervening to provide the needed assistance’;113 as 
opposed to intervening upon a right.  UNGA resolutions are not binding, but given the original 
2005 UNGA unanimous support and UNSC resolutions having regularly referenced R2P,114 
discourse places R2P into the category of an ‘emerging norm’ of international law; without, 
however, the level of certainty sufficient to comfortably represent a clear exception to the 
general prohibition.  Member state responses to the 2009 report show political division on 
R2P’s scope and implementation.115  Subsequent analysis will show that only R2P’s first pillar 
has reached customary law status, with the others still developing. 
 
The mentioned elements of when humanitarian intervention can occur, are in essence the same 
as R2P’s three pillars (in particular the third pillar); with criticism capable of being directed at 
R2P for its similarities, depending on one’s perspective.  R2P adds an obligation on the 
international community to provide peaceful assistance, otherwise not present in the previously 
existing humanitarian intervention doctrine.116  As mentioned above, this article will only focus 
on use of force under R2P, although it is in essence the same as humanitarian intervention.  The 
subtle distinctions however enable R2P to improve on humanitarian intervention in theory, 
even if presently lacking state practice on this new argument.  R2P essentially acknowledges a 
legal test for humanitarian intervention,117 with the shift to sovereign responsibility allowing 
the intervention, instead of blocking it.  
 
E     The Integrity of Sovereignty as an Alternative Justification for R2P 
 
As stated, R2P has been recognised and conceptualised outside of the UNGA resolution as part 
of modern sovereignty, with the international community having a secondary responsibility to 
assist.118  If states have a globally agreed duty to protect their citizens from heinous crimes, to 
the extent the duty becomes an element of statehood, then a breach would result in a loss of 
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118 See, eg, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, above n 99; Report of the Secretary-
General - We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, UN GAOR,  45th sess, 
Agenda Item 49(b), UN Doc A/54/2000 (27 March 2000).  
FROM CAUSE TO RESPONSIBILITY 
149 
 
sovereignty.  Redefining sovereignty allows broad R2P use of force to occur, as this avoids any 
conflict with the UN Charter relating to state domestic affairs, territorial integrity and political 
independence.  Despite lacking state practice and clear opinio juris, states can pursue this 
argument legally.  
 
International sovereignty is not law-based but a source of law itself.119  Also, sovereignty is not 
a matter of degree, but a result.120  Since the UN’s formation, the world has continued to 
develop, with international standards and benchmarks needing to be subject to new 
interpretations and reforms,121 where there are no viable alternatives for resolving conflicts.  
State practice is relevant to treaty interpretation, which includes the UN Charter.122  
 
Sovereignty is an essential structural part of the modern state system.123  If interpretation of 
sovereignty has changed, then sovereignty is not as inviolate as it was in the Westphalian 
system.124  The UNSC resolutions referenced above mentioning this state responsibility, can 
be used to evidence this.  Crawford has explained ‘statehood’ as a form of standing within the 
international legal system.125  States are presumed to have various rights and responsibilities 
as opposed to statehood creating or proving such rights.126  In international law there is no 
general entitlement to sovereignty; 127  recognition is not a condition for statehood in 
international law, as an entity is recognised because it is a state.128  International sovereignty 
requires recognition from other states to participate in the international community.129   If 
enough states view sovereignty as failed, due to an element of statehood failing, the ‘state’ is 
no longer able to rely on sovereignty as the basis of its territorial independence; thus the R2P 
use of force would not contravene the art 2(4) prohibition.  
 
Countries such as China, Pakistan and Sudan have opposed the implementation of R2P, using 
the concept of sovereignty to criticise it.130  Despite this, it is clear the modern international 
system in which R2P’s critics (and supporters) are operating under, no longer supports a 
concept of sovereignty which implies absolute power, as was proposed by 16th century 
theorists.131  The modern concept of sovereignty is capable of complementing intervention.132  
Regional bodies such as the African Union, have recognised that whilst there is the principle 
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of non-interference and prohibition on use of force, there is also a right to intervene for grave 
human rights matters.133  This recognition was triggered by the same humanitarian disasters as 
the R2P principles’ formulation,134 acknowledging that not taking action on human rights 
matters solely on the principle of non-intervention, is flawed.135  Whilst this does not use the 
new wording of ‘responsibility’ it is evidence of state practice to make the intention acceptable, 
and that not taking action on human rights matters solely on the principle of non-intervention 
is flawed.136 
 
R2P indicates that when a state is unwilling or unable to exercise its responsibility as the 
principal caretaker of its citizens, it loses its right to this primacy and therefore sovereignty.137  
Sovereignty’s new formulation is rooted in the reality of today’s global interdependence.138  
This creates a different type of sovereignty than the one which was a barrier to intervention 
during the 19th and 20th centuries.139  While states have yet to clearly utilise this argument, 
given the nature of sovereignty’s definition, and that acts which are viewed as ‘violations’ can 
still be used as the basis for becoming an international norm,140 it is an important R2P legal 
argument to note.  
 
This present conceptualisation of sovereignty is not dissimilar to the just war theory postulated 
by Grotius, focusing on preventing the wrongdoing of heinous and manifest crimes, and the 
enforcement of unfulfilled obligations, being legitimate ‘just causes’ for use of force.  This 
view of legitimisation of action provides a basis for use of force via R2P, conceptualised 
outside of the UNGA resolution, by tying sovereignty to the obligation to protect one’s people 
from harm where the subjected population faces serious circumstances.  This conception of 
sovereignty also improves upon the theory of just war as formulated in the past, due to the 
judicial international institutions now in operation.  Both the ICJ and the International Criminal 
Court (‘ICC’) exist to examine questions of legitimacy for any just force taken under R2P; 
albeit the ICJ ultimately lacked jurisdiction when the pre-R2P NATO action was challenged141 
and the ICC’s jurisdiction for crimes of aggression is not yet in force.  The proportionality and 
necessity criteria to intervene under this modern sovereignty is explored more fully in the next 
section, where state-specific situations are analysed.   
 
Overall, sovereignty can only be justified as long as the basic right to life is preserved.142  
Arguably, R2P does not breach sovereignty and the UN Charter, as force is used to protect 
‘sovereignty’ from consistent violations of the ruling authority.143   Observing sovereignty 
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philosophically, it is possible to draw the conclusion that sovereigns cannot go against the basic 
objective of their power, which is to protect the life of people, as a type of social contract.144  
Even philosophers such as Locke and Rousseau, who viewed the state as having unlimited 
power, tempered this to the extent it is legitimately exercised.145  R2P ‘sovereignty’ has old 
roots, with states needing to respect the rights of their citizens to ensure non-intervention, as 
articulated by academics in the early 1900s.146  While it may lead to the UNSC being less 
willing to call something a threat to peace and security, the threshold to intervene under R2P 
is arguably high as demonstrated in the discussion on Libya and Syria below.147  
 
IV     PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The structure of the UNSC has allowed and resulted in its actions (or inactions) to be politically 
motivated.148  One permanent UNSC member vetoing a substantive matter resolution makes 
the resolution ineffective.  Often used during the Cold War along political lines,149 the veto 
prevented sanctioned action on humanitarian issues;150 this remains true in the present day.151  
While a version of R2P received collective global acceptance in 2005, it has failed to be put 
into effective implementation.152 
 
The following analysis of the uprisings in Libya and Syria demonstrates how UN-authorised 
‘R2P’ has had limited use and why it is unlikely to be exercised again soon.153  The UNGA 
version of R2P, unlike the ICISS’, does not include an agreement that the UNSC five 
permanent members will not veto humanitarian issues, nor does it include specific approval of 
UNGA or regional organisations taking direct action if the UNSC fails to take action.154  
Arguably to cover the whole R2P concept the UN needs to take further steps,155 expanding 
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their ‘watered down’ version. 156   This is needed, as without an effective, agreed, non-
contentious way to manage and intervene when genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and ethnic cleansing occur, further atrocities will continue to be committed, undermining the 
ability of R2P to fulfil its purposes.   
 
A     The Libyan Civil War 
 
1   The Situation 
 
In what was termed the ‘Arab Spring’, autocratic regimes were overthrown throughout the 
Middle East and northern Africa by civilian uprisings starting from 2010.157  This occurred in 
a bid to overthrow political suppression and fulfil socio-economic demands. 158   In mid-
February 2011 protests started in Libya, and by March the rebellion was a full scale armed 
conflict.159  Those involved in the uprising clashed with the military forces of Libya’s then de 
facto leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi,160 already known for his oppressive regime.161 
 
Libya’s situation devolved rapidly.162  Gaddafi’s use of force against the uprising far exceeded 
the suppression of contemporaneous protests in other states, with indiscriminate shelling of 
urban centres occurring early on.163  Within a month the Human Rights Council (‘HRC’) set 
up an International Commission of Inquiry into the situation.164  It recommended that UNGA 
suspend Libya’s HRC membership.165  The Arab League suspended Libya’s membership to 
their own organisation.166  These actions were based on grave concern over the increasingly 
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violent treatment of the Libyan people, with mass killings, arbitrary arrests and torture being 
reported.167 
 
UNSC Resolution 1970 passed on 26 February 2011168 acknowledged the HRC and regional 
organisation’s condemnation.169  It demanded that the violence end and the legitimate demands 
of the population be fulfilled.170  The UNSC viewed the violence as one of international 
concern and sought to bring an end to the violence by instituting an arms embargo,171 travel 
ban,172 asset freeze,173 and for the matter to be referred to the ICC.174  The resolution was 
passed unanimously.175  The resolution’s IHL reference confirmed the rebellion had progressed 
to an armed conflict.176   In referring the situation to the ICC, the UNSC demonstrated a 
willingness to convey that crimes against humanity were possibly being committed by an acting 
state leader.177 
  
By this point in time the forces opposing Gaddafi had organised into the National Transitional 
Council (‘NTC’).178  In March the UNGA suspended Libya’s HRC membership,179 and the 
ICC opened their investigation. 180   The African Court of Human and People’s Rights 
condemned the situation, making provisional measures that fighting should cease.181  With 
Gaddafi’s call for extermination of the opposition,182 the League of Arab States and the African 
Union condemned the violations of human rights and IHL in Libya,183 as did Libyan rebel 
leaders.184  With non-military measures failing to protect Libyans, the Arab League called for 
a no fly zone to be implemented on 12 March.185  On 17 March the UNSC passed Resolution 
1973, 186 implementing a no fly zone, 187  and authorising member states and regional 
organisations to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and civilian populated areas 
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from attack by Libyan State troops, upon notifying the UN Secretary-General; with the 
exclusion of placing foreign occupation forces in Libyan territory.188  
 
Within two days of Resolution 1973, NATO began bombing Libyan Government positions 
from which attacks upon civilians were imminent;189 NATO activities in Libya throughout the 
ongoing months, were known as operation ‘Unified Protector’. 190   NATO, acting with 
Morocco, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,191 remained in close contact with the 
UN and other regional organisations during its intervention.192  At its commencement, action 
mainly consisted of air attacks on tanks, artillery and units in front line combat.193  In the next 
two months wider attacks on command and control centres were required to prevent 
government attacks on Libyan people.194  In the course of these events, UNSC Resolution 2009 
established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (‘UNSMIL’) under the leadership of 
a special representative to the Secretary-General to help restore order, rule of law, political 
dialogue and public services;195 in addition to starting to lift the arms embargo and asset 
freezes.196 It also recognised the NTC as the official representative of Libya.197  By October 
the ousted Gaddafi had been killed as a result of the fighting.198  The UNSC made 31 October 
the expiry date for Resolution 1973’s no-fly zone and state permission to protect civilians by 
any means necessary.199 
 
While the ‘forceful’ intervention was relatively limited in time, the UNSC remained concerned 
about Libya’s situation, receiving regular updates as the 2012 interim government and 
subsequent Tobruk Government sought to re-establish a functioning society.200  In 2012 the 
UNSC expressed concern about reprisals and called on the Libyan authorities to take steps to 
prevent this, stressing that they had the primary responsibility to ensure this.201  The UNSMIL, 
whose mandate had been continually renewed to try to help the situation,202 had repeatedly 
expressed concerns about the instability caused by resurgent conflict. 203   The increased 
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intensity in fighting in 2014 had dire effects on civilians 204  and worsened the political 
situation.205   In 2014 when UNSMIL had to remove all personnel, 206  there was repeated 
targeting of foreign representatives, especially in the Benghazi area.207 
 
In the lead up to the 2014 violence there was ongoing, widespread abuse, attributed to the 
militias and armed groups throughout the State, which in the preceding three years had failed 
to be held to account.208  There were reports of abductions, torture and killings taking place, 
without State protection being provided;209 these occurred mainly on the basis of political 
perspectives and backgrounds. 210   Indiscriminate bombings (as under Gaddafi) was also 
occurring.211  The UNSC’s approach in late 2014 had been to deplore the violence, calling for 
an immediate ceasefire, and encouraging the African Union and Arab League to try and 
construct a political dialogue.212  The UNSC aimed to use sanctions to create stability,213 by re-
enforcing previous travel and asset bans on certain Libyan people and assets, in addition to 
arms restrictions.214  While the level of violence fell short of necessitating (as yet) further use 
of force authorisation, the UNSC has remained engaged with the situation and is bringing non-
forceful pressure to bear on the Tobruk Government 215  (in its attempt to realise its 
responsibility for the whole of the Libyan population).  
 
2   Requisite Seriousness 
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While the UNSC did not expressly rely on R2P to legitimise its authorisation of force in Libya, 
this situation has been called a ‘textbook illustration’ justifying R2P.216  An examination of the 
reasons for the intervention suggest just war’s criteria influenced both the decision to intervene 
and the widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of the UNSC’s decision.  The crimes and 
atrocities that occurred are not detailed in full below, but are evidenced through the conclusions 
provided by international assessments,217 which give way to the following discussion of R2P’s 
authority to intervene. 
 
In Resolutions 1970 and 1973 the UNSC recognised Libya’s situation as a continuing threat to 
international peace and security. 218   The ICC referral also demonstrated how serious the 
situation appeared. Whilst the UNSC had power to authorise force immediately, it clearly 
sought non-forceful resolution measures prior to Resolution 1973.  It was only once Gaddafi 
concretely demonstrated that he had no intention of abating his attacks, that the UNSC viewed 
forceful intervention as a legitimate course of action.219  As Gaddafi’s words and actions 
escalated, calls to hunt down and execute protestors, ‘door to door’, ‘house to house’ and the 
labelling of opponents as ‘cockroaches’, reminiscent of the Rwandan genocide, convinced the 
global community that the threat was serious enough to warrant  action.220  
 
After force was authorised, the serious threat faced by the Libyan population became 
increasingly evident, allowing the continued involvement of international troops.  In 
Resolution 1973 the UNSC acknowledged that the actions of troops under Gaddafi, consisting 
of widespread and systematic attacks, may have amounted to crimes against humanity.221  The 
ICC Prosecutor reported in May 2011 that based on available information there were 
reasonable grounds to believe crimes against humanity and war crimes had been committed, 
and were continuing despite the UN-authorised force.222  The ICC later issued warrants for the 
arrest of Gaddafi and others during the fighting.223  The ICC Prosecutor’s view was echoed by 
the Commission of Inquiry report in June 2011 which reported violations by the Gaddafi 
regime.224  
  
Post-Gaddafi’s fall, the International Commission of Inquiry in 2012 independently found 
through retrospective analysis that wide ranging human rights violations did systemically occur 
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under Gaddafi forces in 2011.225  The Commission also independently found that abuses were 
still rampant in 2012, with the distinction that they were no longer part of a system of brutality 
directed by the central government.226  The conditions, with 2014 resurgent fighting in Libya, 
have not improved, with inhumane treatment of those in custody or in proximity to the 
fighting.227  
 
3   Authority to Intervene 
  
A wide range of mechanisms were employed in responding to Libya in 2011, before the 
ultimate use of force.228  Peaceful methods had failed with Gaddafi and led to Libya openly 
refusing to cooperate with calls from the international community to cease violence and respect 
human rights and international law.229  The eventual use of force resulted in Libya challenging 
the traditional notion of sovereignty.230  This part of the article seeks to analyse R2P’s role in 
UNSC Resolution 1973, and what R2P action was justified outside the scope of the UNGA 
version.  
 
In the case of Libya, UNSC action was taken. The basis for that action remains contested. Some 
have stated that R2P’s role has been over exaggerated in regards to what occurred in Libya.231  
Whether or not the UNSC was using its general authority,232 R2P was a consideration, even if 
not exclusive. 233   The resolution’s preamble referenced R2P, but not in the substantive 
section.234  It confirmed the Libyan government’s responsibility to protect Libyan citizens.235  
Demonstrating R2P’s first pillar is part of state practice, and considering its implementation, 
also opinio juris forming customary law.  The resolution was silent as to states acting on R2P’s 
later pillars.236 
 
Whilst China and Russia did not veto the Libyan resolution there was political tension, with 
abstentions from the resolution.237  They cited the Arab League’s support for the resolution as 
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integral to them adopting this position.238  In the context of understanding ‘right authority’, the 
consideration of other sources for support is interesting.  It is absurd to suggest that China and 
Russia were looking to the Arab League for ‘authority’ to approve the use of force, but the 
consideration of regional organisations being better placed to understand the necessities of the 
crisis does suggest that there is a division between legitimacy and legality.  
 
Non-veto powers such as Germany, Brazil and India also abstained from the Libyan resolution, 
for reasons including interpretation.239  This leads to the conclusion states were hesitant in how 
R2P was implemented, but accepted the importance of doing something to protect another 
state’s civilians.240  This explains the absence of R2P third pillar language in the resolution 
which utilised any means necessary to protect civilians.  However, it is worth noting, the no fly 
zone use of force part of the resolution, in receiving support from the populace themselves, as 
well as the wider Arab world,241 showed a global support for R2P and a change in regional 
dynamics. 242   This occurred despite a ‘culture’ of interference not being accepted 
historically. 243   This resulted in the first UN mandated military intervention against a 
‘sovereign’ state against the will of the state’s leader.244 
 
The NATO-led intervention never reached the stage of ‘boots on the ground’,245 but use of 
force was not outside the scope of the resolution as long as it served the purpose of protecting 
civilians.  This could be argued as R2P’s third pillar;246 even if not the UNSC’s explicit intent, 
the authorised use of force was clearly informed by just war principles, and in the modern 
context suggested that the UNSC was implementing the third R2P pillar.  A consideration is 
whether, pursuant to the first argument relating to R2P postulated above, UNSC 
acknowledgment could have allowed R2P intervention more broadly, as existing outside of the 
UNGA version.  This consideration, outlined below, is followed by whether sovereignty had 
also failed therefore still allowing intervention.  
 
It is important to note, that regardless of one’s opinion on whether NATO’s action was within 
the scope of the resolution, or a broader part of R2P, NATO was still constrained by 
proportionality and necessity.  At the time initial action was taken, NATO’s response raised 
questions of proportionality and timeliness,247 with some members of the global community 
feeling the resolution generally went beyond what was acceptable.248  The harshest criticism 
accused NATO’s military campaign of desiring regime change, since, in practice, it allowed 
the Libyan opposition advantageous conditions to capture Gaddafi.249  
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The issue with disputing the legitimacy of force taken under the resolution, is whether the 
wording ‘under threat of attack’ in paragraph four of the resolution, allowed the resolution to 
be interpreted overall as defending civilian populated areas not under ‘imminent’ attack.  This, 
in combination with ‘all necessary measures’, was quite broad. 250   Additionally, stating 
‘civilian populated areas’ created a natural tendency for the intervention to favour one side of 
the conflict in terms of the use of force direction.251  Whilst one could go into the minutia of 
the distinction between civilians and the insurgent rebel combatants,252 and when NATO armed 
the rebels compared to when the arms embargo eased, there was no paucity of information of 
what Gaddafi had previously directed towards those who confronted him.  Given that the 
information on crimes against humanity and war crimes occurring under Gaddafi surfaced 
when NATO expanded their action, coupled with the call for more to be done by those opposing 
Gaddafi, arguably there was a necessity for NATO’s expanded actions, as proportional to the 
threat of Gaddafi if he re-gained territory during the fight. 253  NATO therefore remained 
focused on halting civilian suffering.254 
 
R2P occurred in the use of force taken in Libya, and the following seeks to highlight that even 
if this was outside the scope of the resolution, it was still justifiable under R2P.  The UNSC in 
their primary responsibility to act, found that Libya’s situation was a continuing threat to 
international peace and security.255  As previously detailed, the art 2(4) exception, under art 24, 
is not exclusive in nature.  This allowed NATO’s action to fall under a secondary responsibility 
given the status the UNSC provided Libya, if the resolution’s scope was overstepped.  This 
permissive interpretation means the UN Charter was not undermined, in bringing about the 
resolution of atrocities occurring in the situation.  
 
NATO’s wide interpretation concerning operation Unified Protector has clearly caused tension 
with sovereignty’s traditional conception,256 with long lasting political consequences of what 
has been called the widest possible interpretation of Resolution 1973.257  This leads to the more 
polemical argument that NATO’s actions were warranted under R2P regardless of a resolution.  
The regime change allegations directed at NATO became more prominent when further force 
was used to ‘protect future generations from tyranny’.258  However, pursuant to the argument 
outlined earlier, sovereignty is not absolute in nature; a state requires the ability to perform the 
basic functions associated with statehood,259 with R2P thus not breaching sovereignty but 
enhancing it.260  The regime change accusations are less convincing if the basic duty of a 
sovereign to guarantee for the population ‘a system of law and order that is responsive to the 
national population’s needs for justice and general welfare’, is recalled.261  Regime change, 
although not the core of a R2P/just war intervention, is not an unpredictable outcome and 
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makes such intervention controversial.262  Regime change ought not to be attributed to the use 
of force per se, but instead is a reflection of the extreme failure (indeed the refusal) of the 
Gaddafi regime to meet the basic obligations of sovereignty, as evidenced by the presence of 
atrocities.  This meant that there was no political integrity to violate and it was also not at odds 
with the UN Charter.  
 
Objections to ‘humanitarian intervention’ type action often have a political grounding,263 with 
traditional state sovereignty being valued by weaker powers. 264   The Libyan situation 
demonstrated recognition of limited, rather than absolute sovereignty.  The international 
intrusion retained the just war requirement of proportionality by paralleling the failure of the 
Libyan regime and constraining the extent of force to the minimum required to allow Libya to 
re-assert its (atrocity-free) sovereignty.  Human Rights Watch and the International 
Commission of Inquiry in Libya have both acknowledged that NATO followed IHL, 265 
carrying out actions to avoid civilian casualties.266  Whilst this has not helped to lessen the view 
of certain states being resistant to implementing R2P on the misconception it interferes with 
sovereignty, 267  NATO’s action has added to state practice for intervention when the 
responsibility to react calls for it.  
 
The above discussion provides an appropriate analysis of R2P in 2011 Libya.  However, as 
mentioned Libya’s current situation is far from a state of peace, with accountability and human 
rights acknowledgment.  Whilst the UNSC has in its acknowledgement of the continually 
deteriorating situation in Libya, made the point to reaffirm Libya’s independence and territorial 
integrity,268 whether R2P becomes applicable to present day Libya, is dependent on whether 
peaceful means have been exhausted in necessitating a use of force.  Similarly, the state would 
appear to have demonstrated a complete lack of willingness to attempt to protect its people and 
reform the situation.  The exhaustion of these aspects has not yet occurred to the same extent 
of failure as seen in the past; thus it does not yet authorise a repeat of R2P intervention.  The 
current divide in Libya may reach the requisite level of seriousness, but to date, there is a 
distinction between violent clashes in Libya, compared to Gaddafi’s call for extermination in 
Benghazi.  
 
R2P adds a layer of political and moral commitment to principles already existing in 
international law.269  R2P sceptics and decision makers motivated by self-interest politics have 
tried using the narrow R2P role the UNSC debatably allowed in Libya to de-legitimise the 
concept.270  Regardless of the UNSC perspective, R2P was warranted in Libya and in its legacy 
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one cannot expect ‘change to occur overnight’.  There is no doubt that disagreement over the 
Libyan resolution’s scope has significantly attributed to the inability to reach consensus on 
civilian protection issues in Syria,271 upon the civil unrest starting with the ‘Syrian Uprising’.  
R2P is the most comprehensive effort so far to deal with the worst crimes humanity is capable 
of.  It should be acknowledged that development of norms is not always a linear process272 and 
that despite the following discussion, R2P still has potential. 
 
B     The Syrian Uprising 
 
1   The Situation  
 
In 2011 coinciding with the ‘Arab Spring’, there was the start of civil unrest in Syria.273  The 
Assad Government initially sought to limit the protests, but by mid-April 2011 the crisis was 
evident.274  The attempt to silence protestors via military force failed to bring an end to the civil 
unrest, as the protests spread throughout the country.275  Further, it was suspected extremist 
elements were seeking to inflame tensions, ‘mingling with the demonstrators and using the 
demonstrations to attack security personnel and damage Government property.’276  Unable to 
distinguish between extremists and civilians (and arguably making little effort to do so), 
Assad’s forces appeared to have responded with an increased use of force against the protestors 
en masse, even when there was no apparent threat.277  
 
The Human Rights Council’s Commission of Enquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic concluded 
there was strong evidence of human rights and humanitarian violations including, but not 
limited to, arbitrary military attacks against un-armed civilians, raids on hospitals and mosques, 
deprivation of basic utilities (in particular water and communications) and the blocking of 
access to medical assistance.278  The UNSC, whilst clearly having the first responsibility to 
respond to the crisis at an international level, had trouble moving past discussion on the matter.  
Whilst all members expressed their ‘concern’279 about the crisis, it was clear they differed on 
what ‘responsibility’ the UN, on behalf of the international community, had to act.280  This 
stalemate on the appropriate scope of international response undermined diplomatic efforts to 
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negotiate a peaceful outcome. Persistent use of the veto281 meant that it was not until 2014 that 
a resolution was passed that specifically responded to the humanitarian crisis and called for 
accountability.282 
 
2   Requisite Seriousness 
 
The experience of the humanitarian crisis in Syria raises important questions about the level of 
seriousness required to trigger the responsibility to protect.  The Syrian crisis demonstrates that 
a long, protracted conflict in which crimes against humanity are likely to be occurring raises 
R2P, but only at the level of the first pillar (that of state responsibility).  It is clear neither state 
practice nor opinio juris exists to legitimise military intervention unless a significant event, 
development or escalation occurs and, is likely to continue, pushing the situation from a mere 
crisis to something much more. 
 
One must also recall that military intervention is only legitimate under R2P where non-military 
options have failed, or are unlikely to be successful.  The challenge posed by Syria is that the 
success (or lack) of the peaceful means for resolving the humanitarian crisis can be tied to the 
lack of international support behind those peaceful means.  The implication being that in the 
absence of a willingness to resort to force when peaceful measures fail, those responsible for 
the crisis lack motivation to change their behaviour.   
 
Two periods of time can be compared to demonstrate the need for a significant change to raise 
the possibility of military force as a means of protection.  The first was in August 2012, when 
Kofi Annan announced that he was stepping down as Peace Envoy following the failure of his 
6-point peace plan.  At this point more than 10,000 people (mostly civilians) had been killed 
over approximately 17 months.283  At this point, the international community was faced with 
the possibility that peaceful means which appeared to be viable had been exhausted.  Annan 
had been appointed as the joint Arab League/United Nations Peace Envoy in February/March 
2012 and his peace plan had received overtures of intended good-faith engagement from the 
participants, in particular the Assad regime.284  The United Nations Supervision Mission in 
Syria (‘UNSMIS’) was established as an unarmed peacekeeping mission in April 2012, in 
support of Annan’s plan, with a mandate to ‘monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its 
forms by all parties’.285  However, within a matter of months it was evident that the parties’ 
commitment to the peace process was limited.  In July 2012, Russia and China vetoed a 
proposed UNSC Resolution which intended to place weight (sanctions) behind the peace 
process and send ‘a clear signal to all parties that their commitments [to the peace process] 
were binding’.286  
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The reasons for the repeated exercise of the veto regarding Syria are complex and multi-
faceted.287  What is clear, however, is that the lack of substantive support behind the peace plan 
undermined its efficacy.  Annan explicitly attributed its failure to the persistent UNSC 
divisions,288 and the lack of international commitment to resolve the humanitarian crisis.289  
Whatever the reasons for the consistent exercise of the veto within the UNSC,290 the effect was 
that it appears to have left the Assad regime confident that intervention (forceful or otherwise) 
would not occur.   
 
Despite the overt failure of the peace process and the scope of the continued violence in Syria, 
it is likely that August 2012 did not meet the requisite level of seriousness to legitimise use of 
force under R2P.  The reason was that the criteria of necessity (exhaustion of, or unlikely 
success of non-forceful means) could not be met.  While the attempted non-forceful measures 
had in fact been unsuccessful in resolving the crisis, this was not because peaceful measures 
were unsuitable.  Annan in his resignation statement said: 
 
The bloodshed continues, most of all because of the Syrian government’s intransigence … Without 
serious, purposeful and united international pressure, including from the powers of the region, it is 
impossible for me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian government in the first place, and also the opposition, 
to take the steps necessary to begin a political process.291 
 
It is important here to distinguish between the ‘humanitarian necessity’ which triggers 
intervention of the non-forceful kind under the principle of R2P and the just war criteria of 
necessity (and proportionality) which determines whether the use of force is the legitimate form 
of intervention in response to a particular humanitarian crisis.  The two are intertwined, but the 
significant concern is the latter. There was little dispute, even from those exercising the veto, 
that a humanitarian crisis was occurring.292  The debate concerned who was to blame and what 
action was appropriate.   
 
Far from legitimising the use of force, it is clear that there was a strong position that peaceful 
measures could be successful if supported by the UNSC.  In addition to the Kofi Annan plan 
and UNSC supported UNSMIS, a range of non-forceful political and economic measures were 
being attempted by individual states,293  regional organisations,294  and other organs of the 
UN.295  Whilst these measures proved ineffective in bringing an end to the crisis, in August of 
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2012, and with the lack of overt Syrian condemnation from China and Russia, it would appear 
that they were more viable options than using force.296   
 
The lack of necessity for force in August 2012 is further supported by the lack of overt 
enthusiasm for such measures amongst the international community. In seeking to establish 
evidence of state practice and opinio juris with regard to R2P the key factor is not that states 
did not use force at this time, but that force was not a widely supported option.  The proposed 
resolutions tended to be rejected because they ‘failed to adequately address violence emanating 
from Syrian opposition groups, did not explicitly rule out military intervention, and would not 
help to resolve the situation on the ground’.297   
 
The lack of enthusiasm for military measures could be attributed to the international 
community preferring a Russian and Chinese supported outcome.298  It could also be said to 
reflect the presumption against the use of force in the international system and the reality that 
once started, armed force changes the situation without necessarily resolving it.299  Force may 
indeed ‘inflame, rather than improve [the situation]’ and worsen the harm for those most at 
risk.300  Consequently, while the Syrian situation in August 2012 may have been sufficiently 
serious to warrant forceful intervention, the non-forceful measures had not been given the 
opportunity to succeed and thus force at this point would likely not meet the just war criteria. 
 
The second incident that could have potentially triggered use of force was the confirmation of 
the use of chemical weapons within Syria in August-September 2013.301  Unlike 2012, the 
spectre of military action was present in 2013 and (despite claims to the contrary) likely played 
a role in gaining Syrian agreement and cooperation with the negotiated measures.302   
 
The involvement of chemical weapons in the conflict had long been characterised by US 
President Obama as a ‘red line.’303  In August 2012 (prior to allegations of chemical weapon 
usage) he stated: 
 
I have, at this point, not ordered military engagement in the situation.  But the point that you made about 
chemical and biological weapons is critical … We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to 
other players on the ground, that a red line for us is [when] we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical 
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weapons moving around or being utilized.  That would change my calculus. That would change my 
equation.304 
 
In August 2013 it was confirmed that chemical weapons had been used in Syria, and had been 
used against civilians. Whilst the UN Mission Reports did not explicitly attribute their use to 
the Assad regime,305 many other sources did.306  The Assad regime’s offered explanation, 
accepted by Russia, was that insurgents had used the chemical weapons, but conceded the 
Government did hold previously denied stockpiles of chemical weapons.307   Even on the 
interpretation of the information that is most generous to the Assad regime, they admitted to 
the possession of chemical weapons stockpiles308 and conceded that chemical weapons had 
been used in the conflict, whilst denying direct responsibility for their use.309  This at least 
suggests that the Assad regime had lost control over their territory to an extent that they were 
unable to protect the citizens subject to the attack. 
 
The chemical weapons evidence in turn served to demonstrate the Syrian crisis had escalated 
beyond the already recognised civilian tragedy that had persisted since 2011.  Those in favour 
of utilising use of force to intervene and bring an end to the conflict pinpointed this as evidence 
of a significant escalation.  Further, unlike 2012, an increasing number of states and 
organisations called on the UNSC to take definitive action, up to and including the use of 
force,310 with some indicating a willingness, even a responsibility, to act notwithstanding the 
absence of an authorisation.311  The requisite level of seriousness required to legitimise force 
was, therefore, at least closer than it had been 12 months previously.  The issue of authority in 
the absence of a UNSC resolution is discussed below.  Here, the question must be asked, if 
over 100,000 deaths occur over a two year period, and there is evidence of state willingness to 
use chemical weapons against the civilian population (or failure to prevent the use of chemical 
weapons against the civilian population), is not sufficiently serious to justify use of force under 
R2P, then what is? 
 
Key to understanding the requisite level of seriousness (necessity and proportionality) criteria, 
is remembering that R2P is not punitive.  The call for military action must be viewed within 
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the context of the regime’s continuing failure to protect civilians and the seriousness of the 
threat against them.  Consequently, the specific examples of the use of chemical weapons are 
significant in as much as they represent that the risk to civilians had escalated with the parties 
to the conflict both in possession of and willing to use chemical weapons. 
 
Chemical weapons fall into the category of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and it has been 
suggested, their use against populations can be distinguished from the broader humanitarian 
crisis when assessing the necessity and proportionality of action.312  The use of such weapons 
draws analogies to genocide and crimes against humanity because their use represents a 
‘singular disrespect for human life.’313  Then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd drew 
analogies with two of the 1990s’ most visible failures of the international system to ‘protect’, 
Srebrenica and Rwanda.314 
 
The ultimate form of the non-forceful resolution to the threatened use of force - which focused 
on removing the ability for such weapons to be used again - further supports the suggestion 
that the use of chemical weapons against civilians reached the requisite level of seriousness to 
legitimise military action.  The Russian-negotiated accession of Syria to the Convention on 
Chemical Weapons315 and the entry of inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (‘OPCW’) were viewed as removing the threat of further chemical 
weapons use, or at least greatly decreasing the likelihood of further use. 316   Almost 
immediately the threat of military action ceased. The attacks on civilians and the mass 
humanitarian crisis did not.  The 2013 agreement did not end the conflict and international 
oversight may have deterred further use of chemical weapons, but it did not halt the suffering. 
The responsibility to protect the Syrian citizens did not end with the chemical weapons 
agreement.  However, keeping in mind the risk of escalation which could result from military 
action, a peaceful settlement was clearly preferable.   
 
Further, the Assad regime’s co-operation on this one point, albeit against the backdrop of 
potential intervention should they not accede, suggested a willingness to more 
comprehensively engage with the international community.  The regime reluctantly opened its 
borders to UN officials and the scrutiny/destruction of their chemical weapons stockpile.  
Consequently, whilst the humanitarian necessity remained present, the temporary success of 
non-forceful means in relation to this specific form of escalation made military intervention 
less necessary as a form of resolution. 
 
3   Authority to Intervene 
    
From the beginning of the Syrian crisis it has been absolutely clear that there would be no 
UNSC authorisation to utilise military force in Syria.  R2P’s current implementation limits 
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were demonstrated by China and Russia vetoing any R2P military intervention in Syria (and 
many non-military strategies). 317   The reasons for this refusal to implement R2P are 
multifaceted and complex.  Most interesting are the stated ideological objections to 
international intervention within the borders of a sovereign state and the concern over the 
establishment of a precedent legitimising future action. 
   
Before examining the ideological reasons for the blocking of the UNSC resolutions, self-
interest, in particular Russia’s long-standing relationship with the Assad regime,318 must be 
acknowledged as playing a role in the decision not to support R2P interventions.  The economic 
and political interests of the veto powers surely influenced their decision not to support 
intervention.  This long-standing relationship, and recognition of the risks associated with 
international military intervention likely motivated the negotiations that led to a successful 
resolution to the chemical weapons crisis.319  Whilst the situation-specific interests of the veto 
powers will remain a barrier to UNSC authorisation of R2P’s effective use in the future, this is 
hardly a new phenomenon and is the reason that considering the legitimacy of non-UNSC 
authorised use of force is particularly important.  The concern is whether the refusal to support 
action is merely self-interested or reflects a broader ideological concern with putting the 
principle into practice.320 
 
Countries, including South Africa and Russia, were particularly critical of authorising R2P 
force in Syria, seeking to avoid any action which could allow an attempt at ‘regime change’ by 
Western States.321  Heavy criticism of the Assad regime and implied support for the opposition 
raised concern that there was an ulterior motive to the call for forceful measures.322  R2P 
operates on the presumption of state sovereignty, reserving the first responsibility to each state 
to respond to threats within their own borders.  The anti-interventionists were wary about taking 
action within the borders of Syria which could expressly or impliedly affect the sovereignty of 
the state.323  As discussed above, the failure of a regime to the extent of permitting (or failing 
to respond to) crimes against humanity within their borders, legitimises international scrutiny 
and even intervention, proportionate to their failure.  Non-consensual intervention implies 
either a presumed global secondary responsibility for the crisis or complete failure of the 
regime as part of sovereignty.  Either implication would suggest regime change was at least 
desirable if not inevitable.   
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The anti-interventionists’ concerns are not without merit.  While state authorities tended to 
focus on the undeniable humanitarian crisis, there was also clear advocacy in favour of 
delegitimising the Assad regime,324 although care was taken not to advocate regime change.325  
The language of ‘punishment’ in many reports further reflected the suggestion that any use of 
force, while justified by R2P, may have had alternative motivations.326  Such language and 
apparent motivations also could be said to have impacted on the willingness of the Assad 
regime to co-operate and accept non-forceful international assistance.  
 
Further, a lesson learned from the Libyan intervention was that even where the UNSC 
authorises only minimal intervention, once military action is occurring it can rapidly open the 
door to more extensive change.327  An initial series of targeted military strikes may be the 
intended scope of action (eg, destruction of storage facilities or delivery mechanisms in order 
to bring an end to the means of the worst atrocities without regime change), but the likelihood 
of escalation and broader military action is high.   
 
R2P imposes a significant burden of proof on the international community at large (and those 
advocating intervention specifically) to demonstrate the manifest failure of the state to meet its 
sovereign obligations.  While there remain concerns that pseudo-imperialistic tendencies could 
lead to R2P’s misuse in promoting Western interests and Western desire for regime change,328 
these are arguably mitigated by the need for significant evidence from bodies beyond the 
interventionists’ own intelligence services.329  Ideally, individual states would not need to rely 
on R2P to justify their own action.  The culmination of evidence (of both cause and 
proportionality) would compel the UNSC to take action.  R2P is not a panacea for UNSC 
inaction. Instead it asks the international community, not merely those currently members of 
the UNSC, to refrain from treating the intervening state as a wrongdoer. 
 
In Syria, repeated reports from UN and other agencies pointed to the failures of the Syrian State 
to meet its obligations.  At the very least the Assad regime had, as mentioned above, ‘manifestly 
failed to protect’.330   Refusal to support UNSC action on the grounds of Syrian (Assad) 
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sovereignty alone appears to reject the very nature of R2P as universal in its scope.  However, 
given the widespread acceptance of the principle in the early-mid 2000s, it is difficult to argue 
that the UNSC lacks authority to intervene contrary to the will of the Government that has 
failed so manifestly to protect its citizens.331   
 
The UNSC veto problem,332 demonstrates why further evolution of R2P is necessary.333  Even 
the UNSC in a 2014 Resolution, did not go past recognising R2P’s first pillar (that Syrian 
authorities have primary responsibility for citizen protection).334  While recognising Syria’s 
situation as destabilising the region, a humanitarian crisis, and that there were breaches of 
international law, the UNSC deferred from making more definitive statements with regard to 
the international community’s responsibilities in relation to the crisis or the regime’s failure, 
legitimising intrusion into its sovereign autonomy.335  This demonstrates that the other two 
pillars of R2P had not yet reached sufficient state support to be representative of customary 
international law.   
 
In assessing whether intervention could have occurred at either of the points above (or could 
occur in future) under the two interpretations of R2P, it is important to note that in relation to 
Resolution 2139 ‘sole protection’ was not used to describe the Syrian State’s protection role.  
The activities described in UNSC resolution’s preamble,336 were also likely to fall into R2P’s 
ascribed crimes under the Rome Statute. 337   The UNSC has been willing to state that 
occurrences in Syria ‘may’ be classed as war crimes and crimes against humanity;338 this muted 
language is appropriate given the role international courts now possess.  
 
Russia, in particular, has blocked any attempts to expressly attribute responsibility to the Assad 
regime, preferring to emphasise the allegations against those who the regime are fighting.339  
While it is almost certain that atrocities have been undertaken by those fighting the regime, 
surely by this point, with over 150,000 dead and millions displaced,340 the direct responsibility 
of the Assad regime becomes redundant in assessing what action the international community 
ought to take.  The regime’s failure to bring an end to the suffering and their failure to seek 
substantive assistance under the second pillar undermines their sovereign claim to non-
interference and legitimises strong international action of some kind; even if military action is 
not seen as the appropriate action to take. 
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Under the present system, disagreement and deadlock, such as for Syria, is the likely norm.341  
It is logically inconsistent to recognise on one hand that the international community has 
responsibility to respond to atrocities, and on the other hand, prevent its members from 
responding.  Reliance on the UNSC as the sole authority for R2P action will stagnate the 
development of the principle and atrocities will continue unabated.  
 
An interesting aside, which is beyond the scope of this article, is that little consideration appears 
to have been given to the extent to which the actions of those who advocated intervention in 
Syria could constitute a threat to use force.  The art 2(4) prohibition is, of course, on the threat 
as much as the use of force.  Consequently, if the use of force in 2013 would have exceeded 
the limits of R2P, so too would the threat have been unlawful.342  Whilst there is a concern with 
coercing a state to respond, raising the possibility of using force as a means of international 
(humanitarian) law enforcement, without parallel action (gathering of troops) to add weight to 
the oral threat, would appear not to fall within the threshold.343  In addition, the perceived 
absence of any weight behind the 2012 Annan Peace Plan is, as mentioned above, a key 
explanation for its failure.  On the other hand, the likelihood that the US and its allies would 
act without UNSC authority certainly played a role in achieving an outcome in 2013.  Thus, 
while non-intervention is still the norm in R2P the door to non-UNSC sanctioned action is 
slowly creeping open.344  
 
V     CONCLUSIONS 
 
R2P developed in response to the failure of legal mechanisms to adequately prevent and 
respond to atrocities in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.  The political machinations and 
self-interest, combined with the availability of political veto, means the UNSC has a history of 
failing to protect civilian populations suffering at the hands of violent regimes.  Given that 
UNSC reform is unlikely, the R2P process allows states to legitimise their use of force against 
those responsible for the most heinous of rights abuses, with the requirement that abuses be of 
a requisite level of seriousness, and that use of force be reserved as a last resort.  As a standard 
of legitimacy rather than legality, states intervening under the banner of R2P are faced with the 
challenge of providing the international community with sufficient evidence to justify the 
action as sufficiently necessary; both in terms of cause and the scope of response. 
 
In Libya, the developing principle of R2P would appear to have influenced the UNSC decision 
to act, but that decision - and indeed R2P’s exact role - remains controversial.  When faced 
with the Syrian crisis, the UNSC was hampered by political interests and a reticence to ‘act 
against’ the sovereignty of the Syrian regime.  The UNGA ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedures 
established in 1950,345 allow the UNGA to recommend appropriate collective measures in 
response to situations of international peace and security where political deadlock has 
prevented the UNSC from acting.346  However, the procedure cannot direct action to be taken, 
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nor can it ‘authorise’ such action.347  Affirmation by the UNGA would certainly give specific 
action ‘a high degree of legitimacy’,348 but as yet does not change the legality of a particular 
use of force.  Further, the UNGA method comes with its own challenges and was criticised by 
the ICISS, as the required two thirds majority is politically unlikely if there is a UNSC deadlock 
or veto.349  Further, the R2P responsibility is imposed on all states – not on the institution of 
the UNGA.  
 
R2P’s creation highlighted a division between legitimate and legal action. R2P, as adopted 
formally by the global community in the World Summit outcome, requires UNSC approval 
and has resulted in a negative impact on the doctrines’ development; as was highlighted by 
analysing the Libyan civil war and the Syrian uprising.  Only R2P’s first pillar, that primary 
responsibility lies with the state, is consistently accepted internationally.  While just war theory 
was ostensibly replaced when the UN Charter supplanted debates on the legality of use of 
force, this article has demonstrated that just war theory remains relevant in guiding state actions 
in the absence of clear legal rules.  In the context of the UNSC’s recognised limitations in 
responding to atrocities, just war principles provide guidance for the appropriateness of non-
UNSC authorised R2P intervention.  Placing the responsibility (as opposed to a right) to act 
within the existing context of just war theory, demonstrates that proportionality and last resort 
have remained constant factors in the legitimisation of humanitarian-motivated military action.  
These factors remain relevant within the present UN system, with states formally obliged to 
seek peaceful resolution before utilising a use of force exception. Bearing in mind that it was 
preventable atrocities and the global community’s inaction which triggered the creation of the 
R2P concept initially, the continued occurrence of such atrocities suggests that states need to 
take further steps forward.  
 
The modern reality of global state interdependence requires that states should utilise 
intervening force acceptable within the UN system when required, either through being a 
secondary authority or when the breaching ‘state’ no longer meets the requirements of 
sovereignty in the UN system.  States are operating in an uncertain international environment 
in which the legal rules – including those regarding the use of force - are evolving.  While it is 
easy to say that the UN Charter system places a strong legal prohibition on the use of force, 
subject only to defined exceptions, the reality is somewhat less clear.  Action is taken within a 
spectrum not merely of legality but legitimacy and R2P operates to give an intervening State’s 
actions more or less legitimacy.  It remains to be seen whether R2P will ultimately gain 
certainty as a legal principle.  Lacking a clear, authoritative statement of R2P as a legal 
exception to the general prohibition, it is necessary to look to the dual elements of customary 
international law to determine R2P’s status.  Whilst not yet clearly meeting the standard of 
opino juris the state practice seen in Kosovo and the changed political dynamics seen 
supporting the initial intervention in Libya, show that R2P has growing recognition.  It is clear 
that, as with the just war principle, R2P currently serves to guide decisions on the legitimacy 
of action.  It is equally clear that through its continued use and relevance to crimes occurring 
today, there is a strong foundation for R2P to develop into a true exception to the prohibition 
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on the use of force, allowing the possibility of force in response to heinous crimes – with or 
without UNSC authorisation. 
